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The goal of this paper is to grasp the relationship of coexistence, and at times,
discord, between anticommunism and popular culture through a historical and
chronological survey. To do this, this paper will first seek to understand
anticommunism as an ideology with consistent logic, but a as a diverse and
multilayered, mutable and contradictory affect. This gives the advantage of viewing
anti-communism not from the aspect of its production, but of its acceptance. This
can provide a clue as to why anticommunism, which wields unsurpassed power at
present in the world’s only divided nation, Korea, compulsively defends itself while
constantly in a state of insecurity and ambiguity while facing challenges and
resistance, and endless cracks form in its logic. This paper consider the influence
exerted by anticommunism on “anticommunist films” and the reconstruction of the
conditions of “anticommunism” by “anti-communist films” as two dimensions of the
changing face of anticommunism circulating in popular sentiment through an
analysis of the honeymoon/conflict relationship between anticommunism and
popular culture.Introduction: anticommunism as affectual response in popular culture
The goal of this paper is to grasp the relationship of coexistence and conflict between
anticommunism and popular culture through a historical and chronological survey
(Chin-ki et al. 2008, 2009; Sanghur Society 2005; Hŭi-yŏn 2003; Fuji, Takeshi 2011; Fuji
Takeshi 2011; Takeshi 2008; Chŏng-hun & Hŭi-yŏn 2003; Chun-hyŏn, Kim 2007; Lee,
Hana 2012).1 Therefore this paper argues that anticommunism is not an ideology with
a consistent logic, but rather a diverse and multilayered variable affect (Lee 2013a).2
This gives the advantage of viewing anti-communism not from the viewpoint of its
production but of its acceptance, and can provide a clue as to why anticommunism,
which wields unprecedented power over Korea today, the world’s only divided nation,
compulsively seeks to defend itself from challenges and resistance in a constant state
of insecurity and ambiguity, and into the endless cracks in its logic.
The deep rooted origins of Korean anticommunism can be traced back to a few
stages after the colonial period. The beginnings of “anticommunism” as a counterrevo-
lutionary label to suppress the communist movement, a core force in the liberation
movement from Japanese colonial rule, surfaced in the confrontation between the left2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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ences in the 1945 Moscow Conference ignited nationalist sentiment. Leftist commu-
nists in the military were blamed for the violence and bloodshed in the Jeju Uprising
and Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion that occurred around the founding of the South Korean
government, which triggered feelings of horror and insecurity towards communism on
a wide scale (Dŭk-chung 2009)3 and induced South Korean society to turn sharply to
the right. The outbreak of the Korean War was taken as evidence of North Korean
communism’s anti-nationalism, and afterwards the image of war and animosity towards
communism was mass-reproduced through national education and propaganda in
popular culture. Anticommunism was not merely animosity towards communism or
North Korea but animosity towards dissenting forces and class conflict within South
Korean society, and served as the basis of support for the far right anticommunist re-
gime. Thus, the genesis, maintenance, and consolidation of this animosity desperately
sought the veneer of popular culture.
Film was anticipated as the strongest propaganda tool in popular culture for effect-
ively expanding anticommunism and interiorizing it among the citizenry,4 and was
already well known as the “second bullet” in the US and UK propaganda films of World
Wars I and II. Bureaucrats seeking to use film as another type of psychological warfare
argued for modeling the strategies of Soviet and North Korean propaganda films. Need-
less to say, anticommunism exerted a powerful influence on film during its peak in
popular culture in the 1950s and 60s, television’s peak beginning in the 1970s and 80s,
and continued doing so during film’s second peak post-1990. So-called “anticommunist
films” flying the banner of anticommunism were produced with extensive government
support since the anticommunist regime launched by the Park Chung-hee regime in
the 1960s until the June 1987 democratic struggle. As a result, South Korea became
unique among anticommunist countries for “anticommunist films” that constituted an
independent genre.5 The form and content of “anticommunist films” changed accord-
ing to the establishment and collapse of Cold War regimes, stances taken towards
North Korea, and influence of Hollywood genre films. In particular, they faced chal-
lenges in reflecting, reproducing, and playing variations of generational attitudes to-
wards anticommunism (Byun, Jai-Ran 2001).6 Thus the changing state of
anticommunist films is an appropriate text for examining how the populace understood
and accepted anticommunism according to the times. This paper will examine changes
in the circulation/consumption of anticommunism as a popular affect through analyz-
ing the relationship of coexistence/conflict between anticommunism and popular cul-
ture in light of the influence exerted by anticommunism on “anticommunist films” and
how “anti-communist films” reconstructed the criteria for “anticommunism.”The criteria of anticommunism and its coexistence and conflict with popular
culture
1950–60s: anticommunism and humanism
The label of “anticommunist films” refers to films produced with the goal of arousing
anticommunist consciousness or films with anticommunist themes, but the concept did
not have clear stipulations upon inception. The first so-called “anticommunist films,”
Breaking the Wall (Sŏngbyŏk ŭl ttulk’o, dir: Han Hyŏng-mo, 1949) A Fellow Soldier
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Destiny (Unmyŏng ŭi son, dir: Han Hyŏng-mo, 1954) were not labelled as “anticommu-
nist films” at release. Although the Korean War was the critical factor in antagonizing
North Korea for the South Korean populace, anticommunism was not the ruling
ideology or mentality of South Korean society in its immediate aftermath. The “anti-
communist film” label also began to be widely used beginning in the mid-1950s over
the course of a series of debates over what was anti-communist (Chung, Young
Kwon 2010).7 This was of extremely important significance in creating a popular
consensus of anticommunism. As a type of affect based on animosity towards the
other, the ideological offensive of anticommunism in a far right anticommunist na-
tion needed an educational process constantly differentiating and redefining what
was and what was not “anticommunist” in order to gain popular acceptance. That
the societal definition of what was and what was not “anticommunist” was still not
clearly established even in the mid-1950s shows that the content of anticommunism
was highly ambiguous.
The two pillars forming the core of “anticommunist films” were war films and spy
films.8 The first Korean war film, the documentary An Assault of Justice (Chŏngŭi ŭi
chin’gyŏk, dir: Han Hyŏng-mo, 1951) induced both the pleasure of spectacle and horror
of war and was repeatedly used as the typical image of the Korean War even as recently
as a few years ago. The swarming tanks, bombardments, and the blazing island of artil-
lery fire across the horizon were treated as the most striking proof of how the
‘Northern monster that illegally invaded the South unawares on a quiet night’ was vio-
lent, destructive, antinationalist, and anticommunist in nature. Later war films played
the role of constantly reminding the audience of the “brutalities” committed by the
North Korean communists and greatly contributed to creating the horror of when
North Korea might again wage war. Meanwhile, spy films depicting the proxy war be-
tween spies in South Korean society plotting its division and destruction and state
power checking their activities functioned as bastions of preserving the status quo,
prodding the audience to be always alert to the reality of national division. The image
of spies infiltrating the dark margins of society, stirring all manner of societal conflicts
and listening to the short-wave radio under cover of night, served to arouse a wariness
of strangers in the midst of rapid urbanization and a fear of anonymity that instigated
even more regional conflict. Counterespionage in spy films not only meant targeting
the “indirect aggression” of spies dispatched to the South, but the assemblymen, stu-
dents, citizens, and laborers “deceived and turned traitor” by the spies, with the intent
of nipping the buds of class conflict, the democratization movement, and anti-regime
struggles within South Korean society.
The biggest audience of “anti-communist films” were children and youth. The threat
of war and indirect aggression became the basis of horror and fear of communism in
which they were emotionally indoctrinated through a combination of anticommunist
and ethics education.9 Anticommunist slogans, posters, essay and speech contests, and
a significant amount of school routine were dedicated to expanding and strengthening
anticommunism, and communists were described and constantly exposed as “horned
goblins” and “wolves wearing rabbit masks.”10 Group screenings held by schools were
the main form of consuming “anticommunist films,” which played a large role in pre-
serving unpopular “anticommunist films” for a significantly long time.
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completely backfired against the substitution of anticommunism in film. There were
many cases of anticommunist films having the “unintended side effect” of arousing the
united affect of national sentiment rather than the exclusionary affect of “anticommu-
nism” (Lee 2013b; Lee, Hana 2011).11 Anticommunist films which were supposed to plant
feelings of animosity towards North Korean communists also imprinted the affect of
North Koreans as humans and North and South Korea as one nation. What then were
the 1950–60 criteria for “anticommunism” that made it fall into its own contradictions in
anticommunist films?
The surrounding debate over Piagol (Piagol, dir: Yi Kang-chŏn, 1955) and The Seven
Female POWs (Ch’ilin ŭi yŏp’oro, dir: Yi Man-hŭi, 1965), two prominent war films
typical of the period, provide an opportunity to reevaluate the criteria for “anticommu-
nism” at the time (So-yŏn et al. 2003; Han-Sang, Kim 2011; So-yŏn 2003).12 The
screening of both films was prohibited for violating the National Security Act, and in
the latter’s case, the director was charged with an arrest warrant. Piagol, which based
its scenario on a press release from the North Chŏlla Province Police Department on
the capture of the Ppalch’isan communist guerillas, had heavy backing and support
from the military and police during production, but experienced difficulties in its prem-
iere over growing differences in opinion within the government upon completion over
its censorship.13 The Ministry of Education approved its premiere under the condition
of editing or deleting several scenes, but the Armed Forces Information and Education
Division in the Ministry of National Defense opposed the motion. In addition, although
the Department of the Army’s Office of Information and Education Division approved
of the film, the Ministry of Home Affairs commented, ‘It is difficult to see [Piagol] as an
anti-communist film.’ Meanwhile, critics spoke out in favor of Piagol as a great anti-
communist film,14 but the rationales behind judging Piagol as an anticommunist film
or not as such were in fact identical.
This was due to the theme of humanism pervading the film. The logic of espousing
humanism,15 a feature of anticommunist films at the time, manifested in a dual form in
anticommunist films. There was a great divide over whether to highlight humanist
themes by showing the inhumane and immoral acts of the communists in order to
criticize communism, or depict humanistic communists in order to juxtapose the su-
periority of humanism over communism. If it was a case of the former, Piagol should
have been praised as a great anti-communist film, but if it was a case of the latter, it
would be regarded as exerting a “bad influence” on society and extremely dangerous.
This was because teaching the logic behind communism in order to criticize it had the
reverse effect of possibly teaching audiences communist ideology. The fact that the pro-
tagonist, the object of the audience’s empathy, was a communist violated the absolute
antagonism that formed the basis of anticommunism.
The sympathy shown to the communist in this film is certainly not seen in other war
films such as The Battle Line of Freedom (Chayu chŏnsŏn, dir: Kim Hong, 1955), Beat
Back (Kyŏkt’oe, dir: Yi Kang-ch’ŏn, 1956), and A Cross in Gunfire (P’ohwasog ŭi
shipchaga, dir: Yi Yong-min, 1956). These films understood the Korean War not as a
conflict between the Republic of Korea Army and the North Korean People’s Army, but
between that of the UN forces and Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This reflected
1950s anticommunism which deliberately situated Korea as the frontline of the Free
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communist” resulted from the fact that they precisely reflected what was implicated in
the anticommunism of the time. Piagol stirred controversy over the extension of its hu-
manism to include communists when an “anticommunist film” would have positioned
them as inhumane and immoral, and highlighted the South Korean regime as its bearer
of humanism. In the end, the Piagol superimposed the taegukki over the female protag-
onist in the final scene to clearly show her defecting to the South, quieting the dispute
and barely securing its release.
The Seven Female POWs was also problematic for its humanism. In this film, the
North Korean People’s Army confront the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in order
to rescue South Korean female POWs. The communists are viewed from a humanist
perspective and as part of the Korean nation. Although the “anticommunism” espoused
by the government saw the Korean communists as traitors to the Korean nation, this
film strongly highlighted the sentiment that the South and North were one nation. The
communists are also presumed to be the protagonists and the audience is led along that
line of thought by drawing sympathy for the inevitable fate of one of the communists.
The title of Female POWs, which made it seem as if it was attached from the viewpoint
of the North Korean army, also made the film’s ideology highly suspect. The depiction
of North Korea as an independent state also ran completely counter to the anticommu-
nism of the time which saw North Korea as a puppet regime colluding with the Soviet
Union. The instant that an “anticommunist film” such as Female POWs which was sup-
posed to emphasize the fact that North Korea was a place which annihilated humanism
and freedom advocated for the humanism of a North Korean communist, provided it-
self the basis for infringing on the National Security Act. In the end, the title of The
Seven Female POWs was changed to The Returned Female Soldiers and released after
the editing and deleting of problematic scenes.
However, problematic films such as The Seven Female POWs came to be called “anti-
communist humanist films” after the mid-1960s. The filmmakers and critics who sup-
ported these films argued that their humanism was based on a high level of
anticommunist consciousness.16 The government’s logic behind anticommunism which
held humanism should not be applied to North Korean communists in order to be
thoroughly anticommunist could not help but back down from the opinion that hu-
manism was an essential element of “anticommunism” and films with humanist themes
were true “anticommunist films.” If this was ignored, the basis of existence for many
anticommunist films, as well as art films, would have been threatened in popular cul-
ture. This signified that the myth that anticommunism was a type of humanism had
taken root throughout society, and thus the conflict between anticommunism and
popular culture concluded with the ruling class tolerating the combination of anticom-
munism and humanism together. Anticommunism and the problem of humanism
showed the changing face of anticommunism in popular culture and strongly influ-
enced late 1960s anticommunist films.
1970–80s: anticommunism and entertainment
With anticommunism and humanism no longer stirring conflict, a change occurred in
“anticommunist” films. This change was the separation of North Korea’s minority rul-
ing class from its masses and an outpouring of sympathy and tolerance towards the
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bracing the North Korean masses as part of the same nation. This inevitably induced
the weakening of anticommunism, or its inconsistency, due to famous anticommunist
films such as Hero Without Rank (Kunbŏn ŏmnŭn yongsa, dir: Yi Man-hŭi, 1966) and
others that sometimes strongly emphasized nationalism, creating cracks in anticommu-
nism. That is, if communists were repentant and reflected, they would be accepted as
part of the Korean nation. No ideology could surpass the family love equivalent to na-
tional love, as blood was thicker than water.
However, with the election of Park Chung-hee in the sixth presidential election in
May 1967, South Korean society entered a preparatory phase for the Yusin dictatorial
regime and the perspective on North Korea changed with growing conservatism. That
is, anti-North Koreanism, which made all of North Korea, including its masses, targets
of criticism, gradually grew stronger.17 This became even more so after 1968 with the
Blue House raid by armed communist guerillas, the USS Pueblo Incident, and attacks
and raids large and small in the demilitarized zone. With vigilance against North Korea
on the rise, the importance of counterespionage was emphasized. Although it was
already emphasized after the May 16th coup de tat along with the growth of anticom-
munism, it was no longer possible to embrace agents, pawns of North Korean author-
ity, as part of the nation during the late 1960s.
The late 1960s saw changes in “anticommunist films” in two ways. The first was that
films directly portraying North Korean society began to appear. Films such as Accusation
(Kobal, dir: Kim Su-yong, 1967), which depicted events within North Korean society, and
war films such as Legend of Ssarigol (Ssarigol ŭi Shinhwa, dir: Yi Man-hŭi, 1967) and
Dolmuji (Tolmuji, dir: Chŏng Ch’ang-hwa, 1967) were made with North Korean regions
as combat settings. The film adaptation of Hwang Sun-wŏn’s 1953 novel, Descendants of
Cain, which focused on wartime North Korean society after liberation, was also made in
this period. These portrayals of North Korean society had the effect of emphasizing that
not only North Korea’s ruling upper classes, but also its masses, had become different
from South Korean society thanks to having been brought up under communism. The at-
tention to the wartime period after liberation in particular meant that the South Korean
government was endowed with the legitimacy of establishing the nation. Another change
was the prevalence of spy films which began to be actively produced after the Park regime
laid out and flooded the public from 1962 onward with the concrete anti-communist
principles “victory over communism” and “counterespionage.” After the release of the
Hollywood smash hit 007: Dr. No (dir: Terence Young, 1962) in 1965, the spy film trend
started to boom and international spy films set in Hong Kong or Japan were briskly pro-
duced after 1966.
These changes in the late 1960s can tell us why spy films in the 1970s frequently
borrowed topics such as the wartime period after liberation and espionage activities
in the South and North, which was a natural result of the combination of the
above two trends. For example, the Special Investigations Bureau (T’ŭkpyŏl susa
ponbu) series of six films from 1973 to 1976 highlighted the tragic lives of female
spies forced to be government pawns and condemned the North Korean govern-
ment as the root cause of this tragedy while emphasizing the legitimacy of the
South Korean government. Until the 1960s, there were hardly any anticommunist
films depicting the power of North Korea’s upper echelons, but it is not difficult to
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films. The meticulous and vicious methods of these authorities, not unlike that of
criminal organizations, are not displayed on screen but their existence is meant to
be criticism of the hinted at authorities behind the scenes.
The frequent appearance of such direct criticism of North Korean authorities is be-
lieved to have been influenced by the change in South-North relations in the 1970s.
After the July 4th Joint Declaration by South and North Korea, the Park regime empha-
sized the thorough inculcation of anticommunist education while exercising caution
against the rise of groundless unification discourses.18 If anticommunist education prior
to this period was emphasized at the level of elementary schools, it now had to criticize
communism with a more theoretical approach. The core of their criticism was that the
communists were responsible for the division of the South and North as a result of re-
nouncing nationalism, thereby breaking up the left-right coalition in the colonial
period.19 Therefore, at a tactical level, communism took on the appearance of collabor-
ating with nationalism but their intent was to betray the nationalists and overthrow
them in the end. 20 Thus discussions of unification were only possible when armed with
an anticommunist consciousness which should be practiced as a requisite condition for
South-North dialogue.21 The basic premise of this logic meant that the July 4th Joint
Declaration was not an unconditional dialogue and unification but rather a “standoff
without dialogue” that merely transitioned to a “standoff with dialogue” (The Institute
of Counterespionage 1972).22 The visible effects of this manifested as espionage inci-
dents, and thus the issue of counterespionage awakened the people to the fact that they
were the subjects of this standoff.
The changing media environment was the key factor in 1970s “anticommunist films”
emphasizing spy films over war films. The groundbreaking dissemination of television
sets moved the center of gravity in popular culture from film to television, thereby de-
veloping the expression of more popular, entertaining, and titillating topics in order to
attract the attention of viewers. Moreover, although the government extensively pro-
moted anticommunist films, including the establishment of an “Excellent Anticommu-
nist Film” in the 1966 Grand Bell Awards, they were gradually losing their popularity.
Though the debate over how much entertainment could be allowed in anticommunist
films existed since the 1950s,23 entertainment naturally became a feature during the
growth of anticommunist films as a genre and the mass production of entertaining an-
ticommunist films in the 1960s. After the 1970s, the gradually waning popular interest
in “anticommunist films” had to become even more entertaining and popular in order
to attract public attention. Now popularity = entertainment came to be regarded as a
requisite condition of anticommunist films and the more of it there was, the better the
anticommunist film.24 This signified that “anticommunist films” were doing away with
enlightenment and propaganda,25 and films weak in these elements were already unable
to perform their role and function as “anticommunist films.” If humanism was the hot
potato that was the sticking point of the 1950–60s, then entertainment became the
double-edged sword of the 1970–80s aimed at “anticommunist films.”
1970–80s television and film distinguished itself with spy investigation dramas which
emphasized entertainment. Chief Inspector (Susa banjang), which aired on MBC from
1971 to 1984, the most representative crime investigation drama and Investigation
Headquarters (Susa bonbu), the representative spy investigation drama which aired
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gations Bureau film series dealt with real female spies in five of its six films. The fre-
quently used topic of “Women doomed to live lives of suffering in the cruel prison of
society and their time period” induced affects of sorrow and grief. The affect of
“merriness” encouraged by dictatorial regimes since Japanese rule (Rae-sŏp 2011;
Chung-Kang, Kim 2011)27 did not readily appear in popular culture, and comedy, the
only merry form of entertainment, was left unrecognized over its lowbrow contro-
versies. Female spies did not exist as selves who acted accordingly to their beliefs
and values, but were merely depicted as taking orders from authorities behind the
scenes or forced to give up their espionage after falling into the dilemma of love.
There were no longer any disputes over whether communists should be treated as
humans or seen as the same nation, but instead teary and fatalist sentimentalism
became a criterion for the popularity of “anticommunist films.”
Despite the fact that Korean films in the 1970–80s were in decline, “anticommunist
films” saw steady production in the midst of these conditions.28 The narrative of spies
working in secret abroad to threaten peace and security on the Korean peninsula fea-
tured prominently when the security logic of anticommunism took root in the 1980s.
South Korean agents cracking down on spies in the international intelligence wars as
protagonists were made into a type of film genre. Audiences were no longer interested
in “Why he/she was forced to be a spy,” and as avid fans of Hong Kong action films,
sometimes consumed spy films merely as Korean action films. This made the existence
of anticommunist films themselves difficult, and the more anticommunism was empha-
sized, the further they distanced themselves from audiences. Films that toned down an-
ticommunism and borrowed it only as subject matter were so non-ideological to the
point that they were embarrassed to be even called “anticommunist films.” Such dis-
missal of “anticommunist films” from the public was a sign that though they might
have been employed as tools of suppression, the public was turning away from them
out of their own voluntary sentiment.Challenges and variations in anticommunism
1990–2000: democratization and an introspective gaze
Post-1987, South Korean society’s aspirations for democratization and the global at-
mosphere of the Cold War presented new challenges for anticommunist films. A for-
midable challenge to anticommunism arose from a sense of solidarity based on ethnic
homogeneity with North Korea. The visit to North Korea in 1989 by Reverend Mun Ik-
hwan, Im Su-kyŏng, and other figures in the democracy movement implied that the fer-
vor for South Korea’s democratization would extend to fervor for unification. The slo-
gans of ‘minjung’ and ‘minjok’ that were essential to the diverse cultural performances
such as ‘song movement’ and ‘art movement’ in the 1980s protest culture of the univer-
sities indicated that democratization and unification were always inextricably linked. In
this atmosphere, the first appearance of films questioning anticommunism, exemplified
in 1990s war films such as North Korean Partisan in South Korea (Nambugun, dir:
Chŏng Chi-yŏng, 1990), The Silver Stallion Will Never Come (Ŭnma nŭn oji annŭnda,
dir: Chang Kil-su, 1991) and Spring in my Hometown (Arŭmdaun shijŏl, dir: Yi Kwang-
mo, 1998), were signs of cracks within anticommunism. The films, which dealt with the
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the conflict on the South and North. On the contrary, the United States army (foreign
powers) were regarded as providing the source of the conflict and arriving to aid in
destroying the community with an ideology incomprehensible to Koreans’ lives, as well
as a war wherein the reasons for fighting could not be ascertained.
North Korean Partisan in South Korea’s protagonist is a journalist who is not devoted
communist but becomes a party member when joining the rank and file of the Ppalch’i-
san guerillas. However, he is captured in the end by punitive forces after wandering the
snow-capped mountains while straggling behind. Although Piagol was doubted to be
an “anticommunist film” due to the ROK army not appearing, the ROK army here de-
stroys Ppalch’isan guerillas as a repressive punitive unit. Despite that, the film’s Cold
War atmosphere is still enough to take shots against anticommunism. The protagonist
is arrested by the military and police according to the source novel written by a real
journalist following the Ppalch’isan guerillas, (Tae 1988)29 but in the film the scene is
omitted for an ending with the protagonist’s face of despair at the complete annihila-
tion of the Ppalchi’san guerillas. In other words, the film’s protagonist does not defect
to South Korea. In contrast to Piagol, which unnaturally superimposed a waving tae-
gukki over the protagonist’s face in order to prove it was an “anticommunist film,” this
ending aims not to be “anticommunist film” but attempts to eloquently attack anticom-
munism. The film’s thematic awareness is to show the meaninglessness of ideology by
shedding light on an individual swept up in the whirlpool of history.
The protagonists in The Silver Stallion Will Never Come and Spring in my Hometown
are not soldiers but normal people living in traditional communities. However, after the
rape of the simple women by the US army on their return and the inflow of American
culture, they set foot on the path of misfortune and the traditional community is
destroyed. The essence of the Korean War in these films is not the South-North con-
flict, but of that between the Korean people and foreign powers. The America por-
trayed as a friendly nation as part of the blood alliance in 1950s films appears as the
primary cause of conflict in 1990s films. The sense of identity of a member of a Free
World, the most basic principle of anticommunism, appears nowhere in these films. In-
stead, it is the avaricious soldiers of empire who insult the natives as occupying forces
and a nation lacking self-esteem that cannot remove them. This not only clearly reflects
the collapse of the political binary logic of the period but is an extension of the voicing
of anti-American slogans by protesting intellectuals, citizens, and students. The most
important mode of past “anticommunist films,” the war film, was now the genre most
harshly criticizing anticommunism.
In addition, while war films did not directly portray battles, they still had the disad-
vantage of high production costs due to the survival of “anticommunist films” through
government support under the ‘Excellent Film’ system since the 1950s (Lee Hana
2012).30 If one recalls that the many war films and “national films” in the 1960–70s
were made under the systemic support of the Ministry of National Defense,31 it was no
longer possible to make war films which demanded a degree of spectacle without gov-
ernment support even as “anticommunist films.” War films centered on combat made
their reappearance with the release of 2004’s Taegukgi (T’aegŭkki hwinallimyŏ, dir:
Kang Che-kyu). The revival of such war films contributed greatly to the explosive
growth of the Korean film market from 1990 to the early 2000s.32
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ironically could not veer away from the inevitable ideological debates undergone by
past anticommunist films. Struggling to procure a budget of 14,700,000,000 won, the
most expensive budget at the time, the producers requested aid from the Ministry of
National Defense, but were refused on the issue that the film could become “extremely
dangerous.” The attitude of the protagonist lacking the consciousness of a soldier to-
wards to the war and his only becoming a member of the North Korean People’s Army
in order to save their younger sibling was problematic as it was likely to make youth
evade the military and despise war. Moreover, the treatment of sensitive issues such as
the Bodo League Massacre, punishment of collaborators and civilian massacres pre-
sented the problem of South Korea’s immoral handling of the war. On the other hand,
the conservative connotation of the title and the protagonist aiming their gun at the
North Korean army at the end made the film seem as if it was an extension of “anti-
communist films.” However, the film differed starkly from past “anticommunist films”
by viewing the Korean War as clearly a South-North conflict and attempting reconcili-
ation through the metaphor of brotherly strife, as well as attempting to criticize South
Korea’s failure in protecting the lives of its people. Moreover, the difficulty of anticom-
munism’s exclusionary affect to interfere with strong nationalism analogized in the fam-
ily is in fact seen in 1960s war films33 and Taegukgi can be viewed as a case where
anticommunism is betrayed by anticommunist film subject matter.
Although there are slight differences in opinion over whether Taegukgi is a new vari-
ant of “anticommunist film” bearing the trappings of the genre or a post-Cold War an-
tiwar film, there is no debate that the films following it such as Welcome to
Dongmakgol (Welk’ŏm t’u tongmakkol, dir: Pak Kwang-hyŏn, 2005) and The Front Line
(Kojijŏn, dir: Chang-hun, 2011) have totally different viewpoints of the Korean War
and North Korea from past anticommunist films. Dongmakgol shows the original pure
form of Korean people dressed in white simply living their lives unaware of war or
ideology. It is the UN forces on the contrary who destroy the community, which is
saved by the cooperation of South and North Korean soldiers. Similar to the portrayal
of a Korean peninsula without strife before the war in Taegukgi, Dongmakgol also por-
trays the place free of conflict. In the end, the themes of the South Korean people as
victims and the “simple” village being destroyed by assaulters who are not communists
but Americans leading the foreign powers are seen in The Silver Stallion Will Never
Come and Spring in my Hometown and continued in Dongmakgol and A Little Pond
(Chagŭn yŏnmot, dir: Yi Sang-u, 2009). A Little Pond especially portrays a strong anti-
war and anti-American stance from the standpoint of the victims. The No Gun Ri Mas-
sacre portrayed in a documentary style in this film may inadvertently ignore the
Korean War’s essence as a civil war. If most war films such as Taegukgi and The Front
Line adopt extreme realism, Dongmakgol and A Little Pond express a nationalist ideal
embellished with fantasy. This nationalist sentiment which presumes that South and
North are part of the same community is no different from overt criticism of anticom-
munism which desires South Korea’s monopoly over legitimacy and exclusion of North
Korea from the nation.
Furthermore, Dongmakgol and A Little Pond criticize the South Korean state as Tae-
gukgi did. An isolated South Korean soldier in Dongmakgol, overcome with guilt after
detonating a bridge full of refugees on the Han River under his superior’s orders,
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remove their nation’s people by killing them rather than protecting them, while imply-
ing their lack of legitimacy in ruling the nation. In A Little Pond, the South Korean
state is hardly present in the film after it transfers wartime control to the US and is
powerless to stop the killing of its own people. In The Front Line, this viewpoint be-
comes even clearer. In this film, South Korea is shown to be so weak and incompetent
that they are pushed around by the US at the ceasefire negotiation table. Collaborators
are quickly dealt with but the punishment of pro-Japanese is unfinished to an extent
that it is equivocal. Protecting the lives of civilians is not even considered, let alone the
lives of soldiers at the front. The writer of Joint Security Area (Kongdong kyŏngbi
kuyŏk JSA, dir: Pak Chan-wook, 2001), which dealt with the friendship of South and
North Korean soldiers forced to confront each other, also wrote The Front Line where
South and North Korean soldiers meaninglessly shoot at each other and then interact
and sympathize. The nationalist narrative of South and North Korean soldiers sharing
the same sentiments as part of one nation despite warring with each other but not
based on fantasy did not stop with Joint Security Area, but continues to be portrayed in
films following Taegukgi.
War films of the 1990–2000s were produced not only at a higher level of quality than that
of the low-grade genre of past anticommunist films, but criticized and challenged them.
These films carried two viewpoints. One was that instead of viewing North Korea from the
“anticommunist” viewpoint of exclusion, they saw it from a combined perspective of “na-
tion” and the other was grounding the film as a reflection on the South Korean nation.
Films began to boldly question the South Korean nation particularly after the change in
government with the Kim Dae-jung administration. After democratization, the freedom of
expression granted to filmmakers as well as post-Cold War and post-nationalist trends
made it possible to do the unthinkable in questioning South Korea’s legitimacy.
Recent trends: anti-North Korea and the victor’s gaze
Does this mean that these changes have allowed for a post-Cold War way of thinking
to completely take over the Korean peninsula and made it so popular culture can no
longer tread the path of anticommunism? A war film released in 2010 proved this was
not so. At the premiere of 71-Into the Fire (P’ohwa sogŭro, dir: Yi Chae-han, 2010),
critics pointed out the film was conservative to the point that it was “anachronistic,”
but its blockbuster numbers of over 3,000,000 viewers demonstrated that the Cold War
still persisted either in reality or in the mentality of audiences today. The conflict of this
film was clearly between South and North and more precisely between South Korean
student soldiers and a North Korean army general. This North Korean army general
differs from the archetypical communist of past anticommunist films who were coarse
and inhumane and existed to show the cruelty of communism; he flaunts a unique cha-
risma and even has a human side, giving the student soldiers time to surrender for the
reason that they were students and not soldiers. Heading to Pohang under orders from
the Supreme Leader to occupy Busan by August 15, he underestimates the student sol-
diers in his arrogance and misjudgment, giving them time to join with the UN forces
and losing the opportunity to win the battle.
However, recalling that Kim Il-sung’s complete victory in the North Korean power
struggle occurs after the war and the Supreme Leader system is established in the early
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the Korean War suppressing the oppositional faction by the reasoning that the Com-
munist party and Supreme Leader are not the same and direct orders from the Su-
preme Leader should be followed. This film’s imagined general more closely reflects the
abstract “enemy” in the minds of South Korean conservatives who returned to power
in 2008 rather than a real general in the 1950s. This film differs from post-1990 war
films by clearly establishing the fact that the Korean War was an invasion of the South
by the North, not unlike Cold War anticommunist films, but is more anti-North Ko-
rean than anticommunist by presuming that the “enemy” is the Supreme Leader, and
not the party, that embodies communist ideology. Anti-North Koreanism, which began
to appear in the late 1960s, came to pervade all of popular culture after it no longer
had any targets with the fall of real socialism, criticizing the altered form of socialism
in North Korea which differed from socialist countries of the past.
This film, based on the true story of young students risking their lives on the battle-
field for a young and still yet powerless nation, is no different than an epic poem dedi-
cated to the 71 students who gave up their lives for the birth of the nation. The scenes
of student soldiers resolutely writing a pledge in their blood and their mothers calmly
sending them off to battle overlaps with propaganda war films in the last days of the
Japanese empire (Lee, Hana 2013).35 Despite the government being merely two years
old, the students are fully determined to save the “nation” from communism, and these
images overlap with those of wartime right wing organizations’ fanatic sweep of left-
wingers and the baptism of far-right youths in anticommunist education post-1970s.
The film clearly presumes the “Republic of Korea” as a counterpart to North Korea and
features the same sentimental context and emphasis on patriotism and the legitimacy
of the “Republic of Korea” advocated by right-wing scholars in the left-right wing de-
bates over contemporary Korean history and textbooks in late 2010. Moreover, South
Korean conservatives perceived the 2002 Korean maritime border incidents, 2008
Kŭmgang Mountain tourist shooting, 2010 ROKS Chŏnan sinking, and the third North
Korean test trial of nuclear missiles as a sequence of events wherein North Korea
threatened the existing peace in East Asia, and thus emphasized the founding and pat-
riotism for the “Republic of Korea” as a counterpart to the North.
This new anti-North Koreanism appears in several forms in popular culture. In late
2011, comprehensive television programming channels broadcast the first airwaves of
programming on North Korea in various forms. Channels such as TV Chosun (TV
Chosŏn) which allocated much of its news programming on North Korea and the en-
tertainment program Now On My Way to Meet You (Ije mannarŏ kamnida) on Channel
A particularly expend their efforts into reproducing variants on anti-North Koreanism
in the present day. On the internet, the community board Ilbe, mainly operated by far-
right netizens, publicly advocates a twisted form of patriotism and anti-North Korean-
ism. Spy films descending from past anticommunist films are also a form of media
which circulate this new variant of anti-North Koreanism. However, it is interesting to
note that the spy drama IRIS, a spinoff of Swiri (Shwiri, dir: Kang Che-kyu, 1991) and
the South Korean boy- North Korean girl melodrama The King 2 Hearts (Tŏk’ing t’uha-
ch’ŭ, dir: Yi Che-kyu, 2012) vaguely rather than directly criticized the South and North
Korea governments with their narratives of South and North Korea working together
against international organizations fomenting war. Rejecting criticism of the North
Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies  (2016) 1:9 Page 13 of 21Korean ruling authorities while portraying extremist radicals as a minority was a way of
slightly steering away from anti-North Koreanism.
However, recently released spy films actively portray the ruling authorities in North
Korea as “behind the scenes villains.” Spies under their command, or agents, are busy
eking out a living (The Spy, Kanch’ŏp, dir: U Min-ho, 2012), constantly doubted by
their superiors (The Berlin File, Perŭllin, dir: Ryu Sŭng-wan, 2012), or betrayed and dis-
carded in the end (Secretly, Greatly, Ŭnmil hage widae hage, dir: Chang Ch’ul-su,
2013). These ex-spies and spies are not the incarnations of ideologies in the past but
merely scapegoats in the internal succession struggles after Kim Jong-il’s death
(Alumni, Tongch’angsaeng, dir: Pak Hŭng-su, 2012). After president Bush labelled
North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” images of the country in Hollywood movies
included it being the head of a barbaric international terrorist organization, a corrupt
hereditary regime, and an immoral government with contempt for its people’s safety.
South Korean netizens, who even about 10 years ago would have boycotted Hollywood
blockbusters negatively portraying North Korea,36 no longer show any repulsion to-
wards South Korean films depicting North Korea as “villains.” An even stronger anti-
North Koreanism is reproduced in these films which are more entertaining = popular
and more humanist than past “anticommunist” films before them.
The Spy is a story of spies who will do anything for their family and money and are
regarded as not particularly threatening by the South Korean government. To them,
grandiose ideology nor the cause of “unification of the fatherland” is that important;
what matters are their livelihoods and the safety of their families. The superior officer
who comes down to order an assassination is strongly reminiscent of “coldblooded
and heartless” killers frequently seen in past anticommunist films, and the person
behind the order is of course the supreme authority in North Korea. The immorality
and greed of the top North Korean authority behind the scenes also pressures the
protagonist in The Berlin File. Here North Korea does not embody communism but
only acts on its immoral authority to exploit the people to fill its own belly. In
Secretly, Greatly, spies who have assimilated into a South Korean shantytown resist
sudden orders from the party to commit suicide, and the authority behind the order
seeks to assassinate them in preparation for their resistance. In Alumni, the ruling
authorities in North Korea are not unified, and their power struggles are repeated
between the spies in South Korea.
The North Korean ruling authorities aiming the dagger of betrayal at their people
and their internal feuds, spies who assimilated into capitalist society and became accus-
tomed to the people there, spies used and discarded because of both family and love,
spies sacrificed in the power struggles over the hereditary regime, and South Korean
agents viewing this all with pity are all frameworks frequently seen in 1970s anticom-
munist films and Special Investigations Bureau. This is none other than the viewpoint
of South Korea as the victor, with a regime superior to the North’s and the game having
already ended with their victory. As shown in the box office numbers of over 7 million
viewers of The Berlin File and Secretly, Greatly and over 1 million viewers of Alumni,
the gaze of the victor is now ubiquitous among the South Korean populace. This gaze
is problematic in that it makes young viewers naturally assent to anti-North Koreanism
while consuming this genre of film and allows for regulating their political tendencies
and perspectives on the issue of South and North Korea.37
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Viewing the changes in anticommunist films over the decades shows how anticommu-
nism and popular culture ran in parallel or contradicted one another. The following re-
sults in this study can be summarized thus:
1. Anticommunist films were not clearly defined since their inception, and this was
also true of anticommunism.
2. The many controversies over the coexistence of anticommunism and humanism in
1950–60s anticommunist films brought the ruling class to tolerate the combination
of the two in the end. The combination of anticommunism’s ambiguities with
humanism on the contrary instilled awareness of North Korea as still part of the
same people and nation.
3. With the wholesale decline of the film industry, 1970–80s anticommunist films did
not do well without a heavy dose of entertainment, and as a result, their ideology
suffered for it. This was one sign that anticommunism as a whole was gradually
growing further apart from the sensitivities of the populace.
4. The end of the Cold War worldwide and the democratization of South Korean
society during the 1990-2000s brought new challenges to anticommunist films. War
films, one of the two pillars of the genre, changed to having a self-examining
perspective of the nation rather than focusing on anticommunism.
5. With the rise of conservative administrations again since 2008 and North Korea’s
nuclear tests and the third generation of the Kim dynasty, spy films, the other pillar
of the genre, as well as war films, again showed a clear resurgence in
anticommunist tendencies.
6. These variations over the decades in anticommunist films which portray the
South-North conflict are in fact proxies for the South-South ideological conflicts.
In this way, “anticommunist films” do not necessarily spread anticommunism as
claimed in the literature up till now. Although the films portray a South-North con-
flict, they in fact represent the South-South ideological conflicts in many instances.
This can be seen in their function of seeking to unify the South Korean populace
and politics and cutting off criticism of its institutions at the root rather than anti-
communism having the goal of opposing North Korea or communism. Thus, “anti-
communist films” that underwent changes and variants since democratization also at
times had conflicting positions: supporting progressive politics by introspectively
viewing the Cold War South Korean state itself, or supporting anti-North Koreanism
and patriotism by criticizing South Korean administrations friendly to North Korea
and progressives. The conservative regression under the Lee Myung-bak and Park
Geun-hye administrations of so-called “’87 institutions” won as a result of the June
1987 struggle has seen the production of many war films and spy films with anti-
North Korean characteristics. As seen above, Cold War “anticommunist films” car-
ried tendencies that were not necessarily anticommunist in the process of acquiring
mass popularity. Considering that they flaunted them openly after democratization,
the prominence of South-South ideological conflicts in current politics as seen
through war and spy films is due to the dualities and ambiguities existing in
‘anticommunism.’
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In July 2015, Northern Limit Line (Yŏnpyŏng haejŏn, dir: Kim Hak-sun, 2015) was nar-
rowly released with help from the government after over 7 years of halting develop-
ment. Despite the lack of interest in film circles and critically harsh reviews, the film
drew over 6 million viewers, making it a commercial success. The film, which dealt
with a battle with North Korean forces on the Yellow Sea in June 2002 at the height of
the World Cup fervor, could have been called a ‘Veterans Safeguarding the Nation film’
for glorifying the heroic sacrifice of the South Korean navy men. Despite merely em-
phasizing their individual sacrifices, its outspoken criticism of Kim Dae-jung’s North
Korea policy at the time shows that it had no interest in overcoming the anticommu-
nism that Korean War films in the 2000s targeted. Moreover, analyses from each of the
ruling and opposition party representatives that saw the film in light of the past admin-
istration’s North Korea national security policies clearly exposed how anticommunism
was a basis of right-wing claims in the South-South ideological conflict (i.e. left-right
wing conflict in South Korea). The fact that the film’s extreme right wing concept was
the main culprit behind its cold reception in film circles and the causes of its produc-
tion crises clearly illustrates this situation. As shown in the film, anti-North Koreanism
in ‘anticommunist films’ was not expressed as opposing North Korea, but intensifying
criticism of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy which embraced North Korea, and its con-
tinuation by the Noh Mu-hyŏn administration and the consciousness of its supporters,
as seditious and dangerous.
Although the world has now long left the Cold War period behind, the Cold War
situation of tension in the Korean peninsula continues and anticommunism still wields
a strong influence. Despite the meaninglessness of regime competition in the past, the
fact that the National Security Act symbolizing anticommunism could not be abolished
again reminds us that anticommunism was one of the supporting pillars of South
Korea. While at a glance it seems that the red complex of the past has been overcome,
anticommunism meanwhile is reproduced in the name of peace, security, and human
rights, and continues to arouse anti-North Korean sentiment over the veneer of popu-
lar culture. “Anticommunist films” promoted as part of the nation’s enlightenment in
the Cold War period could not help but be fragmented in clashing with the popularity
of genre films. The anticommunist sentiment that sought to exclude North Korea from
the nation in past anticommunist films had difficulty in overcoming the combination of
nationalist sentiment that induced both emotion and tears. It could be said post-1990
war films were fated to become commercial films filled with mostly nationalist senti-
ment that aimed for popular themes of humanism through a critical viewpoint of the
South Korean government.
In addition, the more South Korea feels superior and confident to North Korea, the
more spy films become more polished and vary into a form of “anti-North Korean
film.” Korean films which did not criticize the North Korean elite, acting as extensions
of the people’s government and participatory government’s Sunshine Policy, regressed
to the lineage of past traditional “anticommunist films,” criticizing the North Korean
elite and viewing the North Korean people used as their pawns with pity after the in-
coming of conservatives into power and the third generation of North Korean succes-
sion. On the contrary, if past “anticommunist films” treated the North Korean people
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today pity and tolerate them from the gaze of a victor from a fundamentally different
existence. With the number of people who remember what it was like before division
and those carrying the pain of separated families decreasing, the awareness of unifica-
tion by the younger generation who enjoyed accelerated economic wealth after division
weakening, and the decline of nationalism as an ideology and the poverty of logic be-
hind unification in this age, the viewpoint of North Korea in popular culture is playing
a role in strengthening the 38th parallel in our minds.
However, anticommunism cannot but maintain an unstable existence in popular cul-
ture as the “nation” still resonates more strongly than “anticommunism” with the popu-
lace and reflection and criticism of the South Korea are in and of themselves the
clearest criticisms of anticommunism. Anticommunism wearing the trappings of “anti-
communist film” has lived with and evolved with popular culture but has also come
into conflict with and created discord with it. As film is based on the sympathy of the
populace, the popular circulation and consumption of anticommunist sentiment is not
the same as that of the past. The left-right conflict in today’s politics is embodied in an-
ticommunist films versus non-(or anti-)anticommunist films, and thus while war and
spy films on the surface deal with the North-south conflict, internally they are proxies
of South-South ideological conflicts. Anticommunism is used to deflect blame for in-
ternal conflicts in South Korean society towards the other and as a suppression mech-
anism towards opponents and will continue to survive so long as the South-North
conflict continues and South Korean society does not completely democratize. How-
ever, popular culture based on the affects of the populace will not allow anticommu-
nism to continue in the same form of the past. This is why anticommunism and
popular culture are fundamentally at odds with one another.
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